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Since the 1990s, many Latin American countries have gradually recognized the existence of legal pluralism within their territories. Several international and domestic developments have pushed these states in this direction:
First, a series of collective rights of indigenous peoples, 2 including the right to administer justice by recourse to proper norms and institutions, have been established by international legal instruments, especially by the International Labour Organization Convention (ILO) 169
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1989) , a legally binding instrument that has been ratified by 14 Latin American countries thus far (Kuppe 2010; Yrigoyen Fajardo 2010). 3 Secondly, at the same time, many countries in the region engaged in larger constitutional reforms in order to enhance their legitimacy, and they designed more inclusive political systems. 4 These reforms were influenced by global debates on multiculturalism and differentiated citizenship regimes, which revealed the blindness of liberal notions of rights (such as formal equality) towards existing asymmetries between individuals and groups (Young 1990; Kymlicka 1995) . Thus, in their renewed constitutions, states recognized the culturally diverse composition of their populations and granted collective rights to indigenous peoples, of which 2 In this paper, the term "indigenous peoples" is used interchangeably with alternative denominations such as "groups" or "communities." To date, no consensus on the definition of the term "indigenous peoples" exists.
The recently adopted Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) has not brought much clarity to this contested topic, leaving the decision on the identification criteria for "indigenous peoples" to the respective groups themselves (see Art. 33). Therefore, some analysts and legal practitioners still rely on (equally contested) criteria proposed by the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: see UN Doc. E./CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add. 4.para 379 (1986) . In this study, indigenous peoples are understood as groups who claim to have a historical continuity to ancestral societies who inhabited (parts of) the current national territories prior to the arrival of colonial powers (this continuity can also be cultural in nature), and who consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the contemporary societies.
3 Bolivia ratified the convention in 1991, Ecuador in 1998; see <www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169> (10 March 2011).
4 Throughout the 1990s, constitutional reforms that included provisions on legal pluralism took place in the following Andean countries: Colombia 1991 , Peru 1993 , Bolivia 1994 , Ecuador 1998 and Venezuela 1999 see Yrigoyen Fajardo 2004. Anna Barrera: New Constitutions and Laws in Bolivia and Ecuador 7 the rights to self-govern and to practice and generate proper law form an essential part. The latter challenged what had hitherto been a core concept of the state-building process: the establishment of a homogeneous, exclusive legal order claiming validity for all citizens living within the states' territory (Yashar 1999 (Yashar , 2005 Van Cott 2000a , 2000b Sieder/Witchell 2001; Sieder 2002) .
A third motive for the recognition of group-based rights of indigenous peoples stemmed from international agencies of development cooperation in the context of their broader programs of judicial reform in Latin America. It was held that the recognition of legal pluralism in heterogeneous societies could help to improve the legal protection of marginalized citizens and extend the rule of law, especially where judicial state institutions were ineffective or inaccessible (Domingo/Sieder 2001; Van Cott 2003 , 2005a . which established the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination (Charters/Stavenhagen 2010), the constitutional assemblies of both Bolivia and Ecuador accepted a key demand of their domestic indigenous organizations: 6 they agreed to transform their states from assimilative nation-state models into plurinational state models. Taking cultural diversity as its point of departure, this model envisions that all identity groups living under the umbrella of the state encounter one another as "equals" and share responsibilities of co-governance through institutions in areas that have a common interest. Accordingly, existing institutions (such as the justice systems) require a modification in order to guarantee the representation of these groups and a due consideration of their interests and world views. Simultaneously, the plurinational state is conceptualized as a polycentric entity conceding all groups a due space of autonomy within which they can freely decide the course of their development, 5 See, for instance, Sánchez Botero 1998a , 2009 and Kuppe 2010 Bolivia and Ecuador have not only anchored legal pluralism within their new constitutions, lawmakers in both countries have ever since also been engaged in designing or adjusting secondary legislation so as to incorporate elements of indigenous legal practice into their own judicial systems and have sought means for coordination and demarcation between the distinct jurisdictions. Ultimately, this process has led to the adoption of the new Law on Delimitation between distinct jurisdictions in Bolivia, whereas a homologous Ecuadorian law still awaits its due consideration within the legislature. This, in turn, points to the fact that these developments have taken place in very distinct political contexts: In Bolivia, citizens who self-identify as belonging to an indigenous group constitute a clear majority of the population (62 percent). 8 As a result of mass mobilizations against centuries-long marginalization of indigenous peoples and recent neoliberal politics that disproportionally hit this largely poor sector of Bolivian society, in a historic election in 2005 Evo Morales came to power as the country's first-ever president of indigenous origin.
His electoral campaign had been backed by various social movements that bracketed all their divergences and united their electoral power to haul him into the presidential office. Despite strong resistance by economically dominant white and mestizo interest groups, Morales' policies have hitherto headed towards the "decolonization" of all aspects of the state and statesociety relations. The justice system has figured prominently in this endeavor; its redesign would, in Morales' words, mark the end of a historical period in which the country primarily replicated foreign legal formats (La Jornada, 25 June 2010).
The Bolivian context stands in stark contrast to the Ecuadorian case, where the census of 2010 did not yield conclusive insights on whether the actual proportion of the indigenous population approximates official estimations (6.6 percent) 9 or alternative ones, which range 7 On the plurinational state, see Sousa Santos 2007 Larrea 2008; Aparicio Wilhelmi 2009; Walsh 2009 and Tapia Mealla 2010 . The political relevance of the concept of a plurinational state reveals itself not only by its focus on social reality in its historic and present variants and, thus, its renunciation of the liberal ideal of an integrative nation-state -which has arguably not succeeded in becoming prevalent ever since these states had gained their independence from colonial rule (see, for instance Zavaleta Mercado 1990; O'Donnell 1993; Rivera Cusicanqui 1993; Tapia Mealla 2006 ; Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2007), its significance also becomes apparent when considering that the thorough implementation of this model would imply a considerable reconfiguration of the power relations among the social groups of these states, which helps to explain the resistance that the dominant sectors of both societies have shown against its realization; see Against this backdrop, this paper aims to compare how Bolivia and Ecuador have addressed the challenges posed by the official recognition of the coexistence of a plurality of legal orders since the adoption of their latest constitutions, and to discuss which new problems have thereby come to the fore. In particular, it examines the status indigenous law now enjoys vis-à-vis the state legal system (Section 2), the competences that indigenous legal authorities are authorized to exert (Section 3), the limits imposed on indigenous law (Section 4), the representation of indigenous normative orders within the states' justice systems (Section 5), and the mechanisms of coordination and mediation of conflicts over competences between state and indigenous authorities (Section 6). The conclusion briefly summarizes the main points of convergence and divergence in both cases (see also Table 1 ) and points both to important shortcomings of the new legal frameworks and to factors that will have an impact on their effectiveness in the years to come. The comparison will show that both states have adopted similar approaches considering the definition of indigenous jurisdictions, limits to indigenous legal practice, and mechanisms to coordinate the work of legal authorities. Notable divergences can be found in the provisions on the status of indigenous law vis-à-vis state law, the opportunity of affected parties in conflict to appeal indigenous rulings, and the incorporation of indigenous legal cultures into the state's justice system. Even though many pressing issues have been left unaddressed, the new institutional frameworks still constitute remarkable progress compared to the thin legal foundations of legal pluralism in the period predating the new constitutions.
In the longer term, their effects will depend on the broader political context and the willingness of justice operators and societies to alter long-established prejudices and practices. These provisions can be interpreted as determined steps towards the full legal recognition of indigenous legal practice as envisioned by the respective standards set by the ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP. In addition, the conveying of indigenous and ordinary justice with an equal status is unprecedented in the entire Latin American continent. The Bolivian government is thereby paving the way for judicial co-governance "among equals" and hence approximates the ideal of plurinationality in the judicial realm -at least at the formal level. 
Who is Responsible? Demarcating the Competences of Indigenous Legal Authorities
While facilitating distinct judicial authorities to operate within a single territory, all actors must be able to know which law applies to which situation. The Bolivian and Ecuadorian legal landscapes now involve one general, state-controlled jurisdiction, responsible for all citizens and covering a wide range of legal issues and the entire territory, which intermingles and is partly suspended by a large number of indigenous authorities at the communal level, whose jurisdiction holds sway over particular groups, specific thematic realms (arising from their proper law), and limited geographic spaces. Far from being an easy task, legal provi- 
Bolivia
The Bolivian Constitution, in combination with the Law on Jurisdictional Delimitation, confine the scope of applicability of indigenous law to cases where personal, territorial and material jurisdictions are simultaneously at work: as for personal jurisdiction, indigenous law shall apply to all individuals who are bound by a specific relationship to an indigenous group or who are considered members thereof. Territorially, indigenous authorities have the competence to rule on those legal conflicts that are produced within or affect the territorial jurisdiction of an indigenous community. Concerning the material jurisdiction, indigenous authorities shall rule on legal issues that they traditionally used to address. 22 Bolivia has also established a long list of legal areas for which indigenous authorities may not undertake adjudication, including public and private international law (crimes against humanity, crimes affecting the security of the state, terrorism, trade), criminal law (corruption, the trafficking of human beings, arms, or drugs), or tariff law. 23 Indigenous authorities cannot act upon civil law issues in which the state is a party in the conflict. Nor does their competence extend to violations of the integrity of children and adolescents, cases of homicide or assassination, or issues related to labor, social security, tax, information, hydrocarbon, forest, and agrarian law. 24 In addition to these general rules, an innovative provision in the new Law on the Judicial Branch allows for the territorial extension of a jurisdiction (of a state court, for instance) in cases where all parts of a legal conflict expressively or tacitly decide to submit themselves to a judge who normally would not have the competency over one or all of the persons involved. 25 Overall, the approach to defining the competences of indigenous legal practice by personal, territorial, and material dimensions constitutes a reasonable starting point. Most shortcomings arise from the fact that more complex case constellations and the nature of indigenous legal practices have not been duly considered. For example, if personal, material, and territorial jurisdictions need to be simultaneously at work in order for indigenous authorities to becoming cognizant of a legal conflict, an issue between members of an indigenous community occurring outside of the indigenous territory would apparently not fall within their jurisdiction. Indigenous justice systems also hold no sway over cases in which non-members commit an assault or a theft or induce other types of harm to indigenous persons within in- the habitat of many indigenous persons has long since extended to locations outside their communities of origin. But when searching for "legally recognized" indigenous territories, we find that so far not much progress has been achieved in the creation of specifically designed indigenous circumscriptions, even though the Constitutions of 1998 and 2008 as well as the newly enacted Law on Territorial Organization explicitly call for the establishment of such new entities. 31 Therefore, many rural indigenous communities in the highland are still organized and formally registered as "communes," according to a law dating back to 1937 (Ley de Comunas), or as "associations." The existence of "ancestral lands" of the proportionally smaller indigenous population in the Ecuadorian lowland, in turn, has been seriously put at risk by resource extraction activities conducted by domestic and transnational corporations. 32 With regard to the material dimension, the Constitution stipulates that legal self-governance of indigenous communities shall refer to "internal conflicts" that take place within the territorial jurisdictions of indigenous groups and are not otherwise defined. The draft law clarifies that the term "internal conflicts" relates to any action or omission that destabilizes the harmony, or any act considered not permissible by a given collective. It adds that this competence should be limited neither to specific kinds of offenses nor to the amplitude or severity of a crime. 33 As in the Bolivian case, we can expect this provision to have exceptions (e.g. crimes against humanity), which, from the perspective of international and state law, would typically fall within the states' areas of responsibility.
As for the personal jurisdiction, indigenous authorities shall hold sway on members of indigenous groups when those conflicts occur within indigenous territories. 34 Accordingly, the draft law specifies state courts shall be responsible for resolving conflicts between indigenous and non-indigenous individuals that occur outside of an indigenous territory. In these cases, the courts shall respect the principle of due process, provide the indigenous persons involved in the conflict with a translator, and base their decisions on an intercultural interpretation of the conflict at hand, for which experts in indigenous law are to be consulted. At the same time, those indigenous parties to conflicts who are affiliated with indigenous collectives that dispose of their own organization can ask to be judged for their offenses by their own indigenous authorities. In the same vein, their proper authorities can equally claim their competence to resolve the case. Unfortunately, no mechanism that would determine the con- Interestingly enough, the draft law provides for situations in which individuals deny their membership to an indigenous group. The competence to decide on conflicts between such persons and indigenous collectives is conferred to the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court.
Indigenous authorities may put those persons on trial who unlawfully usurp their functionsa provision that may be interpreted as a preventive measure to reduce the cases in which people abuse the "shield" of indigenous justice to arbitrarily exert justice by their own hands.
Furthermore, indigenous authorities' jurisdiction can be extended to conflicts among nonindigenous campesinos (peasant farmers or workers), provided the involved agree to submit themselves to this legal system. Conflicts emerging among distinct indigenous groups, in turn, shall be resolved by the respective superior organizations of these communities. 36 What is more, the draft law declares indigenous authorities responsible for cases in which non-indigenous individuals violate the rights of indigenous persons within indigenous territories. In cases of non-compliance with the indigenous authority's resolutions, nonindigenous individuals residing in the indigenous territory can be expelled from the community, while all their immobile goods or properties shall be passed to the community in exchange for a monetary compensation. Non-residents can be sanctioned by a material compensation of the harm caused to the community. 37 This provision points to a critical legal field which unquestionably requires regulation. It emphasizes the fact that the lives and activities of indigenous and non-indigenous persons in most parts of the country are highly interdependent, and that some activities conducted on indigenous territories (such as oil exploration by transnational companies) seriously compromise the development of indigenous communities. But it ignores the enormous power asymmetry that may exist, for instance, between a foreign national company owner and an indigenous legal authority. Issues of this type would require a case-sensitive approach, measuring the degree of harm caused by nonindigenous actors. For cases with a considerable power asymmetry, it might be advisable to utilize effective state agencies to mediate between the conflict parties and to secure the protection of the rights of the less powerful communities. However, issues involving natural resource extraction might be better accommodated through the consultation processes with the affected population -in fact, both strategies on their own constitute collective rights of indigenous peoples. 38 Thus, we can expect a high degree of reluctance and criticism against this provision as it passes through the legislative decision-making process. In light of the fact that no such scope for agency was given to the previous Constitutional Court in Bolivia, these recent provisions undoubtedly move in a positive direction by establishing an indirect mechanism of constitutional control over indigenous legal practice that still leaves the initiative to apply it in the hands of indigenous authorities.
With regard to individual claims towards indigenous authorities' rulings, legal provisions are not as straightforward. In general terms, all citizens are entitled to make use of a series of "defense actions" (writs of protection), which can be invoked to demand the fulfillment of constitutionally guaranteed rights. Subnational courts serve as a first stop in this respect, while the Constitutional Tribunal acts only in cases of revision. 48 The "action of liberty" (habeas corpus), for instance, can be invoked by citizens whose lives are at risk, who are unlawfully tried or deprived of their liberty. The "action of constitutional protection," in 
Ecuador
The Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008 establishes that indigenous legal practices should be contrary neither to the constitution nor to internationally codified human rights (particularly the rights of women and minors), whereas the former constitution (1998) also included the state laws and the public order in its respective clause. 51 In contrast to their Bolivian counterparts, indigenous authorities in Ecuador are not obliged to promote and guarantee international and fundamental constitutional norms, but they are supposed to respect them. Similar to the Bolivian case, the Constitution and the Law on Jurisdictional Guarantees and Constitutional Control (October 2009) 52 provide citizens with a series of constitutional guarantees that support them in the effective implementation of their constitutionally enshrined rights. One of them -the "extraordinary action of protection" -is concerned with the constitutionality and due process of court rulings. 53 In principle, this guarantee would enable citizens to appeal state courts' decisions, but legislators developed their own version for decisions emanating from indigenous legal authorities.
According to this provision, individuals or groups judged by indigenous authorities can appeal against these rulings when they believe that their constitutional rights have been violated. Within an (arguably short) time frame of 20 days after the authority's ruling, the affected have to submit their claim to the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court in oral or written form. 54 Decisions on admissibility and about hearing dates must be expeditious; proceedings 49 The other guarantees are the "action of compliance," which can be invoked to oblige public authorities to fulfill constitutional or other codified legal provisions; the "action of privacy" (habeas data); and the "popular are oral and, if necessary, persons involved will be provided with translators of the relevant indigenous language. The proceedings prescribe constitutional judges to ground their deliberations on internationally and nationally codified human rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples, and on other national laws. "Ethnocentric and monocultural" (Art. 66.1.) interpretations shall be avoided by developing an intercultural understanding of the presented conflicts, for which experts in the legal practices of the respective community can be consulted. In their resolutions, judges can explicitly "harmonize" (Art. 66.12.) constitutional norms with indigenous norms. As a means of counterbalancing the competences of the Court with those of indigenous legal authorities, judges are also obligated to secure a maximum degree of autonomy for the latter with respect to the exercise of their juridical functions. 55 This legislation goes a step further than the Bolivian one, since the constitutional control of indigenous legal practice is more immediate, enabling persons affected by indigenous rulings to directly appeal them. Therefore, this provision constitutes a powerful instrument for indigenous individuals and groups who are of the opinion that their basic rights were neglected by their own authorities. At the same time, the "appellation body" here is not under the control of indigenous authorities, but is in fact operated by a state institution, which raises the need of a culturally sensitive jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. 
Bolivia
The Bolivian debate on the representation of indigenous normative orders has thus far centered on the reform of the Constitutional Court. As an essential element of the renewal of the judiciary, the Bolivian Constitution prescribes the creation of a Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal, which shall determine the constitutionality of rulings and guarantee the fulfillment of constitutionally established rights. 57 The Law on the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (July 2010) converts this institution into a new space for legal co-governance by determining that at least two of the total seven constitutional judges shall stem from the indigenous judicial system. In an unprecedented innovation in the entire region, the judges of this and all other highest authorities of the judiciary will be elected by universal suffrage. 58 While marking a straightforward end to the traditional method of judicial appointing based on political partisanship or the affiliation with elite families in Bolivia, doubts remain about whether universally elected judges may indeed be able to preserve their independence. The selection of a candidate based on his or her merits presupposes a well-informed citizenry. And even though neither the candidates themselves nor third parties are allowed to conduct electoral campaigns, it also remains to be seen whether the media will voluntarily abstain from influencing public opinion throughout the electoral process (Chivi Vargas 2010: 416-17; Rodríguez Veltzé 2010: 431) .
Candidates for the position of constitutional judge have to fulfill the general requirements for the public administrative service -including the mastering of a second official language of the state -hold the title of lawyer, and have a specialization in the field of constitutional law, administrative law, or human rights. Having exercised the function of a legal authority in an indigenous community is treated only as an asset to be considered among a candidate's merits, whereas the requisite of a second official language is to be applied in a gradual rather than immediate manner. 59 As seen from the perspective of the mostly less professionally qualified members of indigenous groups, these requisites seem very demanding.
Not only does this law foreclose any form of participation of legal indigenous authorities who do not comply with the requisite of having an official legal career (Yrigoyen Fajardo 2010: 35), but we can also anticipate that, for years to come, not many candidates from among the indigenous population will be eligible for the positions reserved for them. These difficulties notwithstanding, the opening of the new Bolivian Constitutional Tribunal for the representation of indigenous judges and the creation of a specialized chamber for inquiries stemming from indigenous authorities (see above) present respectable steps towards a responsible engagement of the Bolivian justice system with the normative diversity present in the country. What is striking, though, is that the Bolivian legislation has thus far not reflected upon the question of how the rights of indigenous persons could be effectively protected in lawsuits held before institutions of the ordinary justice system in more general terms. As discussed in the section on indigenous jurisdiction, it is the ordinary judicial system (and not indigenous authorities) that will be competent, for instance, to rule on violations of the integrity of minors, labor issues, and conflicts between indigenous and non-indigenous persons occurring outside indigenous territories. In this sense, Bolivian lawmakers missed the opportunity to convert legal pluralism and intercultural jurisprudence -mentioned solely as general principles in the introductory section of the Law on the Judicial Branch -into integral parts of all judicial processes in which members of indigenous communities are involved. An interesting strategy in this regard is the engagement of legal anthropologists and their assessments of legal conflicts within judicial processes; this support has proved a valuable source for judges meting out justice in Colombia (Sánchez Botero 1998b). If universities had been asked to adjust their current law programs to the cultural and legal diversity present in the country, and if practicing jurists had been offered professional trainings on relevant topics, the ongoing transformation of the judicial system could have been more sustainable.
Ecuador
The Ecuadorian Constitution likewise calls for a reform of the former Constitutional Tribunal. 60 The members of the previous court will continue in office until they are replaced by a new constitutional body, 61 and according to the recent Law on Jurisdictional Guarantees and Constitutional Control, the new court will basically maintain its former structure and will not provide for specifically reserved seats for indigenous legal authorities.
62
Expressing dissatisfaction with this regulation, the parliamentarian Lourdes Tibán proposes in her draft Law of Coordination and Cooperation between Indigenous and Ordinary Justice the creation of a specialized chamber within this institution which would hold the exclusive competence for conflicts in which indigenous individuals were involved. The chamber is thought to be comprised of representatives from the indigenous and state judicial 62 Candidates for the position of judge of the Constitutional Court are required to be jurists and to have practiced a legal office for a minimum of ten years. Every three years, a third of the total nine constitutional judges will be selected in a procedure that includes the personal application of interested candidates, a phase of pre-selection, and the examination of candidates' qualifications by a committee appointed by the executive, legislative, and the newly created branch of transparency and social control. The entire selection process is planned to be open to the public, and citizens will be able to appeal the qualification of preselected candidates. The judges will be invested with this office for a period of nine years without the option for immediate re-selection; see Art. 171-172 and 177-183 of the Ecuadorian Law on Jurisdictional Guarantees and Constitutional Control.
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Anna Barrera: New Constitutions and Laws in Bolivia and Ecuador systems, as well as experts on indigenous law. Without providing the corresponding procedural steps, the draft foresees that representatives from all indigenous groups of Ecuador should participate in the selection of the indigenous members of this chamber.
63
While indigenous authorities are not directly participating in legal processes led by the state's justice institutions, the Law on the Judicial Branch has established a set of "principles of intercultural justice" for cases involving members of indigenous groups. These principles oblige judicial staff to respect the legal diversity present in this country and to guarantee equality among the parties to the conflict, which may involve the engagement of translators and experts in indigenous law. The state's legal personnel shall obey the principle of non bis in idem, reinforcing thereby the constitutional rule according to which cases submitted before indigenous authorities cannot be examined a second time by state courts (the exception being the constitutional control exerted by the Constitutional Court; see above). Another principle, pro jurisdicción indígena, shifts priority to indigenous jurisdiction in cases of doubt of whether the state or indigenous legal competence prevails. Finally, judges are expected to resolve cases by means of intercultural interpretation, which requires a comprehension of the normative contexts out of which an individual or group is acting, and the consideration of the rights guaranteed in the Constitution and international treaties. 64 With its first key decisions based on this law, the Provisional Constitutional Court has proved its willingness to advance an intercultural form of justice that stands in line with the groundbreaking jurisprudence that has been developed by the Colombian Constitutional Court over the past two decades (Sousa Santos 2010: 85-86; Sánchez Botero/Jaramillo 2009). An illustrative case constitutes the "action of non-compliance" submitted to the Court in 2009 by representatives of the indigenous Amawtay Wasi University against a decision by the National Council for Superior Education of Ecuador (CONESUP). 65 The latter refused a request of this (recently inaugurated) university to offer decentralized academic programs for indigenous students in three remote regions of the country. CONESUP justified its decision by arguing that the actual seat of the university was in Quito and that, just like any other educative center, it would first need to establish its work in this city for a period of at least five years before extending its academic program to other regions. Grounding its ruling on international and national norms, the Court found that CONESUP had mistakenly treated the indigenous university as a conventional educative institution, thereby applying criteria that would go against basic indigenous concepts of knowledge transmission. Indigenous forms of education usually do not follow a unidirectional transmission of information, and even less so through distant educative centers. Transmission takes place within the communities and in mutual exchange of knowledge among all participants. Therefore, the judges agreed with the indigenous claimants that CONESUP's decision had violated their right to maintain their own educative systems based on their own values, forms, and methods.
63 Art. 28 of the Ecuadorian Draft Law on the Coordination and Cooperation between Indigenous and Ordinary Justice.
64 Art. 344 of the Ecuadorian Law on the Judicial Branch.
65 See "Sentencia N°0008-09-SAN-CC."
Avoiding Double Efforts and Conflicts by Coordinating Legal Institutions' Work
Unlawful activities may take place almost anywhere, and since legal subjects can freely move throughout the territory and jurisdictions partially overlap, the distinct legal institutions in Bolivia and Ecuador will need to find viable ways to coordinate their work. Respective legal provisions must not only bear in mind that the functioning of state and indigenous legal authorities underlie fairly distinct logics, but also that these institutions have very different financial, technical, and human resources at their disposal. The parallel working upon specific cases must be avoided, for which more transparency seems indispensable. In certain circumstances, the investigation of a legal case by one legal authority will require the support of other authorities. For this purpose, specific channels and rules of communication would Precisely because of the pertinence of the issues addressed in this draft law -demarcation of jurisdictions, remittance of cases, mutual supply with information, and specification of the Constitutional Court's competences and duties -and considering that many interesting ideas in this respect have been already elaborated by qualified experts in this country (e.g. Salgado 2002), it seems particularly unfortunate that no clear political will on the part of the Ecuadorian government to pass such a law has been evident thus far. 
Conclusion
In light of the thin legal framework to accommodate legal pluralism in Bolivia and Ecuador before the adoption of the new constitutions, the provisions that have been elaborated in the past few years constitute a remarkable progress. This time, political actors in both countries moved beyond paying lip service to the constitution and proceeded to engage with key elements of secondary legislation in order to elaborate more concrete guidelines for a model of justice that takes diversity as its point of departure. These efforts can be qualified as innovative and experimental at the same time. Initial experiences with the reforms and insights gained over the course of time will certainly lead to adaptations and refinements in the future.
Both countries seem to agree on the general directions of their approaches. At the same time, the concrete steps to address specific issues may diverge considerably. This progress notwithstanding, many related issues have been left unaddressed. The effective coordination among jurisdictions, for instance, calls for a much more determined assignation of a budget, technical resources and personnel than political actors have been willing to provide thus far. The coordination efforts would additionally require the designation of an institution that would not only supervise these efforts, but also be capable of mediating between the different world views and interests involved in order to craft flexible solutions that can meet the needs of and adapt to local realities. Importantly, legal institutions have to be brought closer to the citizens, particularly to the rural parts of the countries. Otherwise, many of the newly incorporated legal instruments (such as the exchange of information on specific cases) or the submitting of writs of constitutional protections will remain interesting but unrealizable ideas.
While holding indigenous authorities accountable for complying with human rights, the provisions offer few ideas on how these authorities could be familiarized with the contents of these rights, and how they could actually apply them to the cases they deal with in their own communities. Given the complex inter-legal relationships and patterns of mobility and co-habitation of individuals and groups in both countries, the attempts to define personal, material, and territorial competences of indigenous legal authorities will certainly not suffice to reduce the number of constellations in which legal ambiguity prevails; the Constitutional Tribunals will play a crucial role in this context (Sousa Santos 2010: 90) . Lawmakers should also design affirmative policies towards young indigenous women and men interested in studying a legal career in order to guarantee a more balanced composition of courts and an intercultural interpretation of legal cases in the longer term.
Ultimately, the latest reforms on legal pluralism ignore the prejudices and at times overtly racist attitudes on the part of the non-indigenous populations towards indigenous peoples' practices, and the mistrust, nurtured by many experiences of discrimination and mistreatment, that members of indigenous peoples have towards non-indigenous authorities (Cóndor Chuquiruna 2009: 235; Molina Rivero 2009: 58) . It is here where the underlying structural obstacles for more balanced inter-ethnic relations are rooted; respective measures would have to involve the media and broader society alike.
We should keep in mind that the examined legislation is recent and that some of the newly designed institutions such as the Bolivian Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal have not even been installed as of this writing. More generally, both states have been characterized by political crises and institutional instability for decades. This context has impeded the sustained and coherent work on public policies and the binding of qualified human capital and expertise in critical policy fields. Previous constitutional reforms were often accompanied by little effectiveness in their implementation (Grijalva 2008; Yrigoyen Fajardo 2010: 40-43) . If such factors combine with the lacking political will of the government (as can presently be 28 Anna Barrera: New Constitutions and Laws in Bolivia and Ecuador seen in Ecuador) and the unwillingness of judicial operators to change established habits, the advances in the field of legal pluralism will primarily remain confined to the formal-legal level.
Independent of the concrete form of its accommodation, the interplay of legally plural orders will generate conflictive situations and confront actors with challenges on a daily basis.
Thus, as of this moment, the effectiveness of the current efforts in this field will depend on the following: informed citizens and their willingness to actively invoke their constitutional rights; the creativity of the distinct judicial and law enforcement authorities to find non-judgmental and constructive ways to related to each other and coordinate their work; and, the capability of judges to perceive distinct realities among and within collectives, and to interpret norms and customs in a way that does not do away with but rather re-signifies cultural values and principles so as to guarantee the dignity of all persons involved.
